腐漫网

时间：2026年3月6日14:00-16:00

主题：Autobidding Equilibria in Sponsored Shopping

地点：明德主楼734

主讲人：滕依峰

摘要：

As commerce shifts to digital marketplaces, platforms increasingly monetize traffic through Sponsored Shopping auctions. Unlike classic “Sponsored Search”,where an advertiser typically bids for a single link, these settings involve advertisers with broad catalogs of distinct products. In these auctions, a single advertiser can secure multiple slots simultaneously to promote different items within the same query. This creates a fundamental complexity: the allocation is combinatorial, as advertisers simultaneously win a bundle of slots rather than a single position.

We study this setting through the lens of autobidding, where value-maximizing agents employ uniform bidding strategies to optimize total value subject to Return-on-Investment (ROI) constraints. We analyze two prevalent auction formats: Generalized Second-Price (GSP) and Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG). Our first main contribution is establishing the universal existence of an Autobidding Equilibrium for both settings. Second, we prove a tight Price of Anarchy (PoA) of 2 for both mechanisms.

主讲人简介：

Yifeng Teng is a research scientist in the Algorithms and Optimization team at Google Research. He received his Ph.D. from the Department of Computer Sciences at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, and his B.Eng. from the Institute for Interdisciplinary Information Sciences at Tsinghua University. He is broadly interested in topics in theoretical computer science and economics, with a primary focus on algorithmic game theory, online algorithms, learning theory, and their applications to real-world mechanism design. His work was recognized by the best paper award at WINE 2023.